Optimizely Cyberattack Hit CNN, BBC, Zoom and 178 Sites With Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Kits
On Monday 16 November 2026, visitors to some of the most trusted websites on the internet — CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, HSBC and IKEA among them — were served malicious code without those sites ever being hacked. The attack came through Optimizely, an A/B testing service, after an attacker exploited a flaw in its…
On Monday 16 November 2026, visitors to some of the most trusted websites on the internet — CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, HSBC and IKEA among them — were served malicious code without those sites ever being hacked. The attack came through Optimizely, an A/B testing service, after an attacker exploited a flaw in its account signup flow and planted malware inside the JavaScript snippets that customer websites load from Optimizely’s servers. Researchers found the code in 188 snippets belonging to 178 organisations. The payload swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment card details and tried to push iOS exploit kits onto iPhones. Optimizely says the flaw is now fixed and the code removed.

Optimizely cyberattack: the key facts
| Fact | What happened |
| Date | Monday 16 November 2026; first injection 04:21 UTC (09:21 PKT) |
| Entry point | Flaw in Optimizely Web Experimentation’s account signup flow |
| Scale | Code in 188 of 1,611 snippets checked, belonging to 178 organisations |
| Biggest names | CNN, BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock, Fox News, UNICEF USA |
| Crypto stolen | About $7,000 in roughly nine hours, according to Report URI |
| Card data | Unknown — the skimmer captured card details, but the total cannot be seen from outside |
| iPhones taken over | None confirmed in any public report |
| Status now | Optimizely says the flaw is fixed and the code removed (notice 01:02 UTC, 17 November) |
How the attack worked
Optimizely Web Experimentation is a tool companies use to test different versions of their web pages. Each customer adds a small piece of JavaScript, called a snippet, to its site. Every time a visitor loads a page, the snippet is fetched from Optimizely’s servers and runs a field of custom code called Project JavaScript.
The attacker wrote a small loader into that Project JavaScript field and left the rest of each snippet untouched. The files were still served from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely’s own certificate, so every browser that loaded one also ran the loader — and nothing looked wrong. Some sites serve the snippet from their own domain; those were affected too, because the content comes from the same project. Optimizely’s own main site and login page carried the code as well.
The discovery was made by Scott Helme of Report URI, a firm that monitors the scripts websites run. His team checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found the code in 188 of them. The real number is probably higher, the firm says, because it could only check the snippets it found in time. Some researchers call the campaign OPTIMJACK.

What the malicious code actually did
The loader pulled in a payload file called track.js from the domain 1688360.cc, registered about an hour after the first injection. It came in three versions: most snippets loaded track.js directly, one hid the address in base64 so a text search would miss it, and another carried a full copy of the payload that runs if the domain is blocked. The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day.
| What the code did | How it worked |
| Swapped crypto wallet addresses | Replaced valid Bitcoin, Ethereum, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin addresses with attacker-controlled ones in page text, forms, links, clipboard and requests |
| Skimmed payment cards | Added at 13:43 UTC; captured card number, expiry date and CVV typed into the site’s own payment forms |
| Stole cookies and screenshots | Sent the visitor’s cookies and a screenshot of the page to the attacker after an address swap near wallet or payment wording |
| Targeted iPhones and iPads | Loaded a router script that opened iOS exploit kits in a hidden frame — Coruna (iOS 13 to 17.2.1) and DarkSword (iOS 18.4 to 18.7) |
The wallet swapper only swapped an address that passed its chain’s checksum and sat near a payment word such as wallet, deposit or send — but that was enough. Even copying was unsafe: an address copied from one of these pages could already be the attacker’s by the time it was pasted into a wallet. The skimmer had one limit worth knowing: it could only read card details typed into the site’s own forms, not cards entered in a cross-origin payment iframe such as Stripe’s hosted fields, and the cookie theft could not read cookies marked HttpOnly.
iPhones and iPads: what actually happened
On iPhones and iPads, the code loaded a script called boot.js from two .icu domains. It read the iOS version and opened an exploit chain in a hidden iframe: Coruna for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword for iOS 18, and for iOS 26 a separate chain that so far only collects details about the device. Between 17:13 and 17:57 UTC, the attacker also added a Coruna iframe to every visit from iOS 18.6 or earlier, and those pages reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit — something a visitor could actually notice.

Here is the honest part: no public report has confirmed any iPhone actually taken over. Cynet’s researchers retrieved the second stage using an emulated iPhone browser and described it as conditional delivery, “not a successful compromise of a physical iPhone or iPad”. The kits target flaws Apple fixed by February 2026, and their own notes treat iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, as patched.
Timeline: 16 November (all times UTC; add 5 hours for PKT)
| Time (UTC) | Event |
| 04:21 | First injection seen, in the BBC’s snippet |
| 13:43 | Card skimmer added to the payload |
| 17:13–17:57 | Coruna iOS exploit iframe added to visits from iOS 18.6 or earlier |
| 19:25 | Attacker’s wallets had received about $7,040 in crypto |
| ~20:40 | Mass cleanup begins |
| 21:52 | Only 1 of the 188 infected snippets still carries the code |
| 23:11 | Every infected file clean |
| 00:37 (17 Nov) | Payload domain 1688360.cc put on clientHold; no longer resolves |
| 01:02 (17 Nov) | Optimizely confirms the incident in a status notice |
| 04:11–05:39 (17 Nov) | Attacker empties the crypto wallets |
How much money was stolen?
About $7,000 in cryptocurrency reached the attacker’s wallets within roughly nine hours, according to Report URI. StepSecurity, which analysed the same addresses, put the total lower, at about $6,600. Two caveats matter: two of the attacker’s wallet addresses were already in use before the injections began, and StepSecurity’s analysts wrote that “the chain does not show which transfers came from victims”. How many card numbers, cookies and screenshots reached the attacker’s server cannot be seen from outside, so the full impact is genuinely unknown.
What to do if you visited one of the affected sites on 16 November
Update your iPhone or iPad now. Install the latest iOS version — iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, which the exploit kits’ own notes treat as patched. This is the single most useful step, and it protects you against far more than this one campaign.
Check any card you used on 16 November. If you typed card details into a payment form on one of the affected sites that day, watch your statements closely for the next few weeks and contact your bank if anything looks unfamiliar. Report URI and StepSecurity both advise replacing any card entered on an affected site that day.
Check any crypto payment you made that day. Compare the address you actually paid with the address you meant to pay. If the two differ, the address may have been swapped. Never paste a wallet address without checking its first and last characters — copied text is exactly what this attack tampered with.
For website owners, the lesson is sharper: audit the Project JavaScript in every project, rotate credentials and tokens, and keep third-party scripts off checkout pages. Pakistan’s own cyber watchdog has been warning about exactly this kind of threat — read our report on National CERT’s warning to banks, power and water systems over AI-driven cyberattacks. The uncomfortable truth is that a Content Security Policy allowing cdn.optimizely.com would not have helped, because the code came from that very host.
Why this attack matters
Supply-chain attacks work because they abuse trust instead of breaking it. Nobody who visited the BBC on Monday did anything careless. They loaded a page from a news organisation they trust, and the page quietly loaded a script from a vendor that news organisation trusts. The browser had no reason to object: the script came from the right domain, with the right certificate.
What will last longest is the question Optimizely has not yet answered: how did a flaw in an account signup flow give an attacker write access to the projects of 178 unrelated organisations? Until that is explained, every site that loads third-party JavaScript has reason to ask its vendors the same question. For readers, the takeaway is simple and needs no panic: update your phone, check your statements, and double-check wallet addresses before you send crypto.
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Frequently asked questions
What was the Optimizely cyberattack?
On 16 November 2026, an attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely Web Experimentation’s account signup flow and planted malicious JavaScript in the snippets customer websites load from Optimizely. It reached visitors of 178 organisations, including CNN, the BBC and Zoom, and swapped crypto addresses, skimmed cards and targeted iPhones.
Were CNN, BBC and Zoom themselves hacked?
No. Their own servers were not breached. The malicious code came through the Optimizely script their sites load, served from Optimizely’s own servers with its certificate. A site that delivered the code has not necessarily had its own systems compromised.
How many websites were affected?
Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found malicious code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organisations. The real number is likely higher, because it could only check the snippets it found in time.
How much money did the attackers steal?
About $7,000 in cryptocurrency reached the attacker’s wallets within roughly nine hours, according to Report URI. StepSecurity put the total at about $6,600. How many card numbers were captured is unknown.
Was any iPhone actually hacked?
No public report has confirmed any iPhone actually taken over. The payload tried to load the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, but the flaws they target were fixed by Apple by February 2026. iPhones on iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, are treated as patched.
Is the Optimizely attack still going on?
No. Optimizely confirmed the incident at 01:02 UTC on 17 November, said it fixed the flaw, removed the code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and notified affected customers. The payload domain no longer resolves.
By Fatima Raza | Technology | Updated 17 November 2026

